indicators of future potential, such as an upward evolution in value creation and ability to raise follow-on financing. Finally, the programme has many positive indirect effects. This leads us to tentatively conclude that public BAN support is warranted. However, to make this conclusion more robust requires a longer-term evaluation.
.
Risk capital refers to external equity financing of entrepreneurial companies and encompasses both formal venture capital (VC) and informal risk capital, also known as business angel (BA) financing (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2001 ). Formal VC is provided by institutional, professional investors, while BA financing is provided by private investors with no family or friend connections to their investees (HARRISON and MASON, 1999; EVCA, 2002) . Sohl (2005) estimates that 227,000 U.S. BAs invested $23.1 billion in 49,500 companies in 2005, compared to VC investors investing $21.7 billion in only 2,939 companies (PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS et al., 2006) . There is a relative scarcity of statistics on European BA investments. Mason (2006) estimates that 20,000 to 40,000 U.K. angels yearly invest £0.5 billion to £1 billion in 3,000 to 6,000 companies, backing eight times more startups than VC investors.
While a small number of growth-oriented start-ups contribute disproportionately to innovation, economic growth and job creation (e.g. WONG et al., 2005; FRITSCH and FALCK, 2007) , policy makers believe that there is a market failure in that many entrepreneurial companies are prevented from exploiting growth opportunities due to a lack of risk capital (MASON and HARRISON, 2003; CARLSON and CHAKRABARTI, 2007) .
Hence they have established support programmes to stimulate risk capital financing and thereby foster economic growth (CUMMING, 2007) . This perceived failure in risk capital markets is addressed either by directly increasing the supply of risk capital or by increasing F o r P e e r R e v i e w O n l y expected returns to investors through decreasing taxation, improving exit markets, or reducing barriers to entrepreneurship (DA RIN et al., 2006) .
Risk capital has been shown to have a strong regional dimension, with risk capital investors often specializing in investing in a geographically concentrated region (CARLSON and CHAKRABARTI, 2007; CHRISTEN, 2007) . Whereas the European Commission argues that VC activity needs to be regionally clustered in order to create necessary levels of specialization within high-tech clusters, the OECD and some EU member states have argued for a more even regional distribution (MARTIN et al., 2002) . Following the latter view, government policies throughout Europe and the U.S. have often focused on ensuring an adequate regional supply of risk capital (e.g. VENKATARAMAN, 2004; CHRISTEN, 2007) .
Various studies have assessed the impact of public policies aimed at stimulating formal VC markets (e.g. LERNER, 1999; 2002; AYAYI, 2004; DA RIN et al., 2006; CUMMING, 2007) . There is, however, a lack of insight into the effectiveness and efficiency of policies targeted towards BAs, such as tax reliefs, support of BA networks (BANs) or BA coinvestment funds (MAULA et al., 2007) . In the current paper, we evaluate one type of government intervention programme to stimulate informal risk capital: the support of BANs.
We focus on one Belgian region, Flanders, as this allows an in-depth assessment. We assess whether the programme is warranted by evaluating whether it is based on the right assumptions and has achieved its goals.
We proceed by providing theoretical rationales for government intervention in the informal risk capital market and describe how and why the Flemish government has supported BANs. Thereafter, we discuss the research method used to evaluate the programme. In the results section, we evaluate its direct effects and briefly discuss its indirect effects.
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE INFORMAL RISK CAPITAL MARKET
Government intervention in the informal risk capital market is based on a market failure argument, caused by R&D externalities and information problems (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2003b; MURRAY, 2007) . R&D externalities refer to the fact that the value of R&D investments is not fully internalized, as they generate benefits for parties outside the company (LERNER, 1999) . While investors would like to appropriate all returns generated by high-potential companies given their high perceived risks (DA RIN et al., 2006; MURRAY, 2007) , R&D externalities prevent this, leading investors to provide less financing than would be socially optimal (CUMMING, 2007; MURRAY, 2007) . Small firms might be especially prone to this due to "their lesser market power and inability to finance the aggressive defence of intellectual ownership infringements" (MURRAY, 2007, p. 14) .
A second source of market failure is the high level of information asymmetry in small and young companies, caused by a lack of track record and profit generation and resulting in high uncertainty for investors. Hence, these companies are constrained from access to public capital markets and bank financing (DA RIN et al., 2006) . Moreover, R&D investments do not create collateralisable assets. As financing of low-collateral companies requires monitoring (HOLMSTROM and TIROLE, 1997), arm's-length lenders constrain credit towards these companies (DA RIN et al., 2006) . Therefore, they have to rely on BAs or VCs as they more actively monitor their investments (BERGER and UDELL, 1998) . 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 However, due to scale economies in these costly processes and in order to further reduce risk,
VCs have shifted their focus toward larger and older investments (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2003a; MASON and HARRISON, 2003) . Furthermore, VC investments tend to be geographically concentrated and focused on a few industries (LERNER, 2002; CARLSON and CHAKRABARTI, 2007; CHRISTEN, 2007) . Hence, it is argued that small and young ventures, especially those active in regions or industries with little VC, have difficulties in raising sufficient capital even if they have great value-creating potential.
Therefore they resort to BA funding, which therefore may be particularly important in regions where VC is lacking (MASON and HARRISON, 1995) .
Another information problem is the lack of transparency in the informal risk capital market. Entrepreneurs are not always fully informed about the array of possible financing sources and their characteristics ( VAN AUKEN, 2001 ). Even if they understand BA financing, they are not always able to locate BAs, as these often do not want to make their investment intentions public. In the same vein, BAs have trouble in locating valuable investment opportunities (MASON and HARRISON, 2002) . These problems led to the creation of BANs, which provide an information channel between entrepreneurs and BAs without giving up the privacy of the latter (HARRISON and MASON, 1996b) .
Conclusive evidence concerning the existence of a market failure is lacking (MAULA and MURRAY, 2003; JÄÄSKELÄINEN et al., 2006) , as the lack of risk capital may be due more to the poor quality of the demand than to the unavailability of capital (MASON and 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 HARRISON, 2002; 2003) . Venkataraman (2004) argues that risk capital is a necessary, but non-sufficient condition for fostering regional growth-oriented entrepreneurship. Intangible regional assets, such as access to novel ideas, role models or region-specific opportunities, are equally important. Merely injecting risk capital in a region may thus lead to promoting lowquality entrepreneurship (VENKATARAMAN, 2004) .The lack of financing per se is not enough to constitute a market failure; the financing constraint has to regard value-creating companies.
REGIONAL APPROACH TO INFORMAL RISK CAPITAL: BUSINESS ANGEL NETWORKS
Increasingly, governments take a regional approach to reduce the perceived risk capital market failure (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2006) : policy is implemented at the lowest level possible, on the condition that it is still efficient (SUNLEY et al., 2005) . In addition to addressing specific regional market conditions, regional risk capital programmes are also warranted as geographic proximity is important in the early-stage investor-investee relationship (SUNLEY et al., 2005; CARLSON and CHAKRABARTI, 2007) . For an investment to take place, face-to-face contact between investor and investee is required to reduce information asymmetries and create trust (EBAN, 1998; AERNOUDT, 1999) .
Proximity further facilitates active coaching and advising, allowing companies to benefit more from the investor's network and effort (MASON and HARRISON, 1995; SUNLEY et al., 2005) .
One regional measure aimed at facilitating early-stage funding is the public funding and support of BANs. Based on an evaluation of the potential of establishing regional BANs in (EBAN, 2005a; . It was initially assumed that public subsidies were needed to launch BANs, but that these could become self-supporting after five years thanks to revenues from membership fees, success fees or sponsoring (HARRISON and MASON, 1996a ; VAN ROMPUY, 1999 ). This assumption is, however, not confirmed (HARRISON and MASON, 1996a) . Governments are now confronted with the question whether subsidies have to cease as initially foreseen -which would result in most BANs closing down -or whether long-lasting structural subsidies are justified to maintain the BANs. A critical evaluation of BAN support is hence timely. The success of BANs has been both widely endorsed and strongly contended, but there is no agreement on their effectiveness (HARRISON and MASON, 1996a; MASON and HARRISON, 2002) . Harrison and Mason (1996a; provided the only BAN evaluation study to our knowledge and so represents our only benchmark. In order to advance their work and make a thorough evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of public BAN support, we concentrate on one region in Belgium, Flanders, from 1999 to 2004.
The first Belgian BAN, Vlerick BAN, was subsidised by the Flemish government in 1999.
Three other BANs were subsequently founded and subsidized. Together, they were the only BANs operating in Flanders until 2004 (after which they all merged) and all operated in the 
HOW TO EVALUATE GOVERNMENT PROGRAMMES?
According to Lerner and colleagues, the "starting point for any evaluation of a government programme is the goals it was designed to achieve" (LERNER et al., 2005, p. 140) , which is what most evaluation studies do (e.g. BOYNS et al., 2005; MAULA and MURRAY, 2003; AYAYI, 2004; LERNER et al., 2005; CUMMING, 2007) . Through BAN subsidies, the Flemish government's goal was to stimulate regional entrepreneurship, innovation and job creation by reducing the perceived information and financing problems (sub-goals) entrepreneurial companies face ( VAN ROMPUY, 1999) . The BANs' mission was to create a market where entrepreneurs looking for finance and BAs looking for investments could find each other. In addition, one needs to assess the assumptions the initiative and its objectives are based upon (MAULA and MURRAY, 2003) . The assumption the Flemish government and the European Commission made when subsidising BANs was that there was a market failure, namely that some value-creating entrepreneurial companies suffered from financing problems. Finally, in order to assess the full impact of a government programme, one needs to go beyond its direct effects (HARRISON and MASON, 1996b; LERNER, 1999 3. Do these companies contribute to regional economic development?
4. What are the indirect effects of the BAN subsidies?
RESEARCH METHOD
Researchers have generally used either one of two approaches to study the foregoing questions. Some relied on qualitative data by gathering general information on the government measures taken and/or by interviewing beneficiaries or experts (e.g. MURRAY, 1998; DOSSANI and KENNEY, 2002; MAULA and MURRAY, 2003) . Others compared the performance of beneficiaries to that of comparable non-beneficiaries using a quantitative approach (e.g. LERNER, 1999; AYAYI, 2004; CUMMING, 2007) . A contribution of our study is that we combine both approaches, leading to a richer understanding and rigorous analysis of the research questions. entrepreneurs and investors, perceive market failure in terms of information and financing problems and in the contribution of BANs in reducing this failure.
As interviews provide subjective views, we complement them with hard data, namely the financial accounts of all companies that received BA financing through one of the BANs (BAN-backed companies). We compare their debt capacity prior to BA investment to that of a matched benchmark group of non-BA-backed companies. In order for a market failure to exist, BAN-backed companies should have depleted their debt capacity prior to BA investment. If not, they should be able to access traditional debt financing sources. A firm has depleted its debt capacity if its financial risk, measured as the ratio of the book value of debt to total assets, is high or if it does not have the capacity to service the fixed interest and principal repayments attached to debt, measured by its internally generated cash flows (LEMMON and ZENDER, 2004) . We add profitability measures such as return on assets, pre-tax profit and operational profit as further indicators of a firm's risk (e.g. ALTMAN, 1968) .
A second pre-investment comparison relates to companies that did not resort to a BAN but nevertheless received BA financing. This is relevant as one might argue that, in an efficient risk capital market, entrepreneurs with value-creating projects should be able to raise BA financing even without a BAN. First, having a poor personal network might be an indication of the inability of the entrepreneur to network with third parties that are relevant for Failure to find a personally known investor might be an indication of excessive agency risk.
Hence, entrepreneurs with a high ability and low agency risk should be able to find a BA without a BAN. If the above reasoning holds, we expect BAN-backed companies to be more risky than companies that found BA financing through another channel. If, however, the risk of both groups is the same, then this is additional evidence of market inefficiencies.
Further, in order for a market failure to exist, companies facing financing constraints should have value-creating projects. In order to assess how "effectively and profitably" (MURRAY, 2007, p. 8 ) the BAN-backed companies employ their financing, we measure their return on assets (ROA) from the year of BA participation up to four years thereafter. Ideally, we should compare ROA to the companies' funding cost to assess value creation. As it is difficult to estimate the funding cost of unquoted companies, we compare the ROA of BANbacked companies to both that of non-BA-backed companies and companies that found BA financing through another channel. Hence, we assume that these companies have a comparable funding cost 2 . Additionally, we conduct the same analyses on value added -a proxy for sales -(rescaled by total assets) as a robustness check. Value-added is the difference between operating income and the value of inputs.
In order to assess whether BAN-backed companies contribute to economic development, we studied the absolute amount and growth in employment and value-added (LERNER, 1999; EVCA, 2002) and the federal taxes paid by the BAN-backed companies (EVCA, 2002) .
Growth is calculated as the average yearly growth from the year of BA investment to the last were also removed. The final samples consist of 34 BAN-backed companies and 50 BAbacked companies that received BA financing through another channel.
In order to assess the marginal impact of a government programme, we need a sample of similar companies that did not benefit from this programme (LERNER et al., 2005) . Hence, we match the BAN-backed companies to non-BA-backed companies on age, industry and size (LERNER, 1999; PURI and ZARUTSKI, 2007) . Age is measured in the year prior to BA participation or the year of BA participation if the BA participated at start-up. Second, we match the BAN-backed companies on industry based on the NACE-BEL codes (comparable to 3-digit SIC codes). Third, we match on size, proxied by total assets. for the non-BA-backed sample (although the difference is not statistically significant). Their lower cash flows and profit ratios suggest that their financial risk is higher and therefore the probability of raising financing from traditional sources is lower. The qualitative interviews provide further evidence for the financing constraints. When asked why they opted for BA financing, 18 entrepreneurs stated that there were no other options. Conversely, merely 5 out of 28 entrepreneurs referred to expected BA involvement and value-added as a motive for looking for BA financing. Although 17 entrepreneurs stated that they had another investor in prospect at the time of BA investment -either banks or family and friends -they always admitted that both options were less suitable compared to BA money. They were either reluctant to mix personal and business life or the stringent conditions that go along with bank financing were not optimal for the company. Quantitative and qualitative results hence support the existence of financing constraints for entrepreneurial companies: these companies could probably not have found (the total amount of) financing through other sources.
We further find support for information problems in the informal risk capital market.
There are no differences between the financial risk of BAN-backed companies and companies that found BAs through another channel, neither pre-investment ( that there are few differences between the two groups of BA-backed companies.
In conclusion, although financing and information problems do plague entrepreneurial companies, we cannot label this as a market failure yet as the BA(N)-backed companies are value destroying in the short term. However, we do notice a J-curve trend in the measures of value creation, what might point to the fact that these companies need more time to deploy their capital in the most effective way (LERNER, 1999). The short-term analyses may therefore underestimate the long-term value creation potential. For now, we advise caution in using the market failure argument as grounds for defending government programmes in the informal risk capital market but also point to the long-term potential of these companies. A longer time period is needed to see whether the positive evolution continues.
CONTRIBUTION TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The ultimate goal of the Flemish government was to stimulate regional economic growth and development ( VAN ROMPUY, 1999 BANs generated a direct return of €1.03 in taxes. Following their J-curve type evolution, the BAN-backed companies initially pay significantly less taxes than the non-BA-backed companies, but this difference disappears after three years when the taxes paid by BANbacked companies increase dramatically (Table 2) . It is further remarkable that they pay significantly less taxes in year 3 than companies that received BA financing through another channel.
Finally, we assess job creation using several measures. Employee growth is significantly higher in BAN-backed companies than in non-BA-backed companies and comparable to that in companies that received BA financing through another channel. If extrapolated, all BANbacked companies together employ 495 people, representing 102 net jobs created (187 jobs created minus 85 jobs destroyed) from the year of BA participation until the last available year. Each BAN-backed company has created 1.84 jobs on average over the observation period (corresponding to an average yearly growth of 0.52 FTE), representing a subsidy of €8,399 per job created. As there is a high probability that BAN-backed companies would not The Flemish government thus succeeds in stimulating economic development and growth through the subsidization of BANs. BAN-backed companies generally contribute as much as companies that found BA financing without a BAN and significantly more than non-BAbacked companies in terms of value-added and job creation, although they do initially pay less taxes.
INDIRECT EFFECTS
An exhaustive evaluation of a government initiative needs to go beyond its direct effects (HARRISON and MASON, 1996b; LERNER, 1999) . In addition to matching entrepreneurs and investors, BANs may provide other benefits, such as raising the awareness and legitimacy of BA financing, coaching and educating investors and entrepreneurs (which for the latter also entails feedback from potential investors) and enabling entrepreneurs to raise further financing thanks to BA financing, both at the time of the initial investment and later (HARRISON and MASON, 1996a; LUMME et al., 1998) . Although hard to quantify, we briefly discuss each of these impacts. VAN AUKEN, 2001; PAUL et al., 2003) , raising the awareness of potential market participants is an important task of BANs.
Interviewed entrepreneurs and BAs agree that BANs have conducted a considerable awareness campaign on the existence and merits of BA financing. Furthermore, both parties considered this task to be important.
Additionally, BANs can coach entrepreneurs on writing a business plan or presenting themselves to potential investors. If BAs are not the most appropriate funding source, BANs can refer entrepreneurs to other, more suitable investors. The feedback provided by the BAs themselves may also be important. Even if entrepreneurs do not find an investor, they might strengthen their opportunity based on feedback received from the BAs they talked to.
Education and training is a related task. BANs often provide specialized courses to investors and entrepreneurs on issues as negotiation, taxation or valuation. Based on our interviews, we found that entrepreneurs praise the BANs for their education and coaching. Although BAs consider the BANs to perform rather well in educating entrepreneurs, they suggest more emphasis on educating BAs although they do not consider this to be a critical task.
A final indirect effect is the fact that BA funding might enable entrepreneurs to raise additional financing, both at the time of BA financing and thereafter (HARRISON and MASON, 1996b) . Cumming (2007) Further, 61% of the entrepreneurs state that the BA financing had a positive impact on follow-on financing. Fourteen companies were able to raise follow-on bank financing, two VC financing and four raised financing through other channels such as government subsidies.
On average, they raised another €365,000 following BA financing. According to Harrison and Mason (1996b) , one quarter of the companies should be able to attract at least 50% of the original amount as follow-on financing. The Flemish BAN-backed companies performed well as one quarter of the BAN-backed companies were able to raise 168% of the original amount.
This yields further positive evidence of potential future value creation (CUMMING, 2007) .
These results suggest that the Flemish BANs, in addition to their direct effects, also generate important positive indirect effects.
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Designing a successful programme that addresses failures in the risk capital market without crowding out the private sector is not easy. International evidence shows that countries as Israel, Australia and the US have implemented successful programmes supporting the VC market (CUMMING, 2007) . The goal of the present study is to evaluate whether one type of government intervention in the informal risk capital market, namely the subsidization of BANs, is warranted. We first assessed whether the subsidies have reached their goals of reducing the financing problems of value-creating entrepreneurial companies and, by doing so, stimulating economic development and growth. Second, we assessed whether this intervention was based on correct assumptions. Government intervention in the risk capital market is usually based on the perception of a market failure. Therefore, we evaluated whether there is a failure in the BA market, i.e. whether there are value-creating companies that face financing problems caused by information problems or R&D spillovers.
We further assessed some indirect effects.
Based on quantitative and qualitative data, we find clear evidence of BANs reducing information and financing problems of entrepreneurial companies. BANs finance particularly young companies with high financial risk in high-tech industries. These companies are most prone to information asymmetries and financial constraints. Moreover, entrepreneurs and BAs state that they would not have known each other without BANs. The programme is additive: it increases the supply of funds to entrepreneurial companies, rather than crowding out the private sector. Further, these companies do contribute to economic development and growth.
In this sense, the Flemish government programme is a success as its goals are reached. At this point in time it is hard to assess whether the supported companies create value in the long term. In the short term, they seem to destroy value, but there is an upward trend in value adding and profitability in the last years of the analysis, what might point to these companies just needing more time to deploy their resources in the most effective way. The fact that most companies are able to raise significant amounts of follow-on funding is a further indication of future potential. The Flemish BAN programme produced positive indirect effects and compares well to the UK's DTI initiative, our only benchmark (HARRISON and MASON, 1996b ). In conclusion, the fact that this programme has successfully reached its goals, created many positive indirect effects and that the companies supported through this programme hold value-creating potential, lead us to conclude that public BAN support is justified. However, in Our study has a number of limitations. First, we mainly focused on the subsidies' direct effects. As the externalities of the subsidies are hard to quantify, the impact of the government subsidies might be underestimated. Second, some positive outcomes, such as total BA money invested due to the existence of a BAN, might be over-estimated. Third, one could argue that publicly funded BANs should be compared with non-publicly funded ones. As the ultimate goal of BAN subsidies is to reduce information and financing problems of entrepreneurial companies, we consider it more relevant to study the ultimate beneficiaries of the measure.
Moreover, none of the Flemish BANs would have existed without the subsidies: they were instrumental in setting up and running the BANs. There were (and still are) no Belgian BANs operating without subsidies (EBAN, 2005a) .
We propose some suggestions for further research. As most BAN investments are young, we were only able to assess their post-investment performance up to four years. In order to Given the relatively young nature of the latter programmes, we leave this as an avenue for future research. 4: These amounts are lower limits since not all BAs were willing to provide this information.
5: This differs from the €20.83 mentioned before since there is no perfect overlap between the interviewed BAs' investments and the interviewed companies.
6: BAN-backed companies have significantly lower value-added ratios compared to non-BAbacked companies until year 2, but the difference is not significant thereafter.
7:
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